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TELL THE SMART HOUSE 
TO MIND ITS OWN BUSINESS!:  
MAINTAINING PRIVACY AND SECURITY 
IN THE ERA OF SMART DEVICES 
Kathryn McMahon* 
 
Consumers want convenience.  That convenience often comes in the form 
of everyday smart devices that connect to the internet and assist with daily 
tasks.  With the advancement of technology and the “Internet of Things” in 
recent years, convenience is at our fingertips more than ever before.  Not 
only do consumers want convenience, they want to trust that their product is 
performing the task that they purchased it for and not exposing them to 
danger or risk.  However, due to the increasing capabilities and capacities 
of smart devices, consumers are less likely to realize the implications of what 
they are agreeing to when they purchase and begin using these products. 
This Note will focus on the risks associated with smart devices, using smart 
home devices as an illustration.  These devices have the ability to collect 
intimate details about the layout of the home and about those who live within 
it.  The mere collection of this personal data opens consumers up to the risk 
of having their private information shared with unintended recipients 
whether the information is being sold to a third party or accessible to a 
hacker.  Thus, to adequately protect consumers, it is imperative that they can 
fully consent to their data being collected, retained, and potentially 
distributed. 
This Note examines the law that is currently in place to protect consumers 
who use smart devices and argues that a void ultimately leaves consumers 
vulnerable.  Current data privacy protection in the United States centers on 
the self-regulatory regime of “notice and choice.”  This Note highlights how 
the self-regulatory notice-and-choice model fails to ensure sufficient 
protection for consumers who use smart devices and discusses the need for 
greater privacy protection in the era of the emerging Internet of Things.  
Ultimately, this Note proposes a state-level resolution and calls upon an 
exemplar state to experiment with privacy protection laws to determine the 
best way to regulate the Internet of Things. 
 
*  J.D. Candidate, 2019, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., 2012, College of the Holy 
Cross.  I would like to thank Professor Joel Reidenberg for guiding me and lending his 
expertise throughout this process.  I also would like to thank my family and friends for their 
constant love, support, and encouragement. 
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“Can you play dollhouse with me and get me a dollhouse?” asked six-year-
old Brooke to Amazon’s voice-activated Echo Dot, “Alexa.”1  Brooke also 
discussed her love of sugar cookies with Alexa.2  A few days later, both a 
dollhouse and a four-pound box of sugar cookies totaling $160 arrived at 
Brooke’s doorstep.3  At first her parents were confused about the items’ 
origin, but they soon realized that Brooke’s discussion with Alexa, whether 
 
 1. Jennifer Earl, 6-Year-Old Orders $160 Dollhouse, 4 Pounds of Cookies with 
Amazon’s Echo Dot, CBS NEWS (Jan. 5, 2017, 5:41 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/6-
year-old-brooke-neitzel-orders-dollhouse-cookies-with-amazon-echo-dot-alexa/ 
[http://perma.cc/DV8J-YC2D]. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
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she had intended to place the order or not, had resulted in the seamless 
delivery of some of her favorite things to her home.4  Brooke’s experience 
and so many others like it show the immense capabilities of smart devices 
today.  Smart devices have changed the way we function on a daily basis.  
The capabilities of these devices can make our lives easier and more 
efficient.5  We now can ask a device to turn on our lights, play music, vacuum 
our floors, and even lock our homes remotely.6 
Although this modern convenience is appealing, these technologies expose 
consumers to risks they never imagined.  Take the negative consequences of 
data collection as an example.  In early 2017, a television manufacturing 
company settled a lawsuit with the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the 
New Jersey Attorney General’s Office for $2.2 million for installing software 
that could collect user viewing data in eleven million consumers’ televisions 
without their consent or knowledge.7  The complaint alleged that Vizio was 
monitoring its users’ “second by second” viewing information and assisting 
in combining that data with certain demographic information including sex, 
age, marital status, education level, household size, and income level.8  The 
complaint further stated that Vizio then sold that information to third-party 
companies for targeted advertising.9  According to Kevin Moriarty, an 
attorney with the FTC’s Division of Privacy and Identity Protection, “Before 
a company pulls up a chair next to you and starts taking careful notes on 
everything you watch (and then shares it with its partners), it should ask if 
that’s O.K. with you.”10 
But why does this matter?  In today’s fast-paced society, should we not be 
jumping at the opportunity to have a vacuum cleaner do our cleaning without 
us, have Alexa remind us of our dentist appointment, or have our lights turn 
themselves off even if it means giving up some of our privacy?  While it is 
true that the prevalence of smart devices—particularly within the home—has 
the potential to make daily life easier, these devices are also gathering and 
storing vast amounts of information about our homes and our habits within 
 
 4. Id. 
 5. See, e.g., Camryn Rabideau, 10 Gadgets That Will Prevent Everyday Problems and 
Make Your Life Easier, USA TODAY (Sept. 22, 2017, 1:24 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/ 
story/tech/reviewedcom/2017/09/22/10-gadgets-that-will-prevent-everyday-problems-and-
make-your-life-easier/105879344/ [https://perma.cc/Z8H2-KSCP]. 
 6. See Christian de Looper, The 12 Best Smart Home Devices You Need to Live Like the 
Jetsons, BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 7, 2017, 12:15 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/best-smart-
home [https://perma.cc/K2EU-TKKP]. 
 7. Press Release, FTC, VIZIO to Pay $2.2 Million to FTC, State of N.J. to Settle Charges 
It Collected Viewing Histories on 11 Million Smart Televisions Without Users’ Consent (Feb. 
6, 2017), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2017/02/vizio-pay-22-million-ftc-
state-new-jersey-settle-charges-it [http://perma.cc/D6GQ-R9PN]. 
 8. Complaint paras. 17, 32, FTC v. Vizio, Inc., No. 2:17-cv-00758, 2017 WL 7000553 
(D.N.J. 2017); Press Release, FTC, supra note 7. 
 9. Complaint, supra note 8, para. 16(c); Press Release, FTC, supra note 7. 
 10. Hayley Tsukayama, These Smart TVs Were Apparently Spying on Their Owners, 
WASH. POST (Feb. 6, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2017/02/ 
06/these-smart-tvs-were-apparently-spying-on-their-owners [https://perma.cc/XTG5-6BZQ]. 
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our homes.11  How this data is stored, used, and shared is critical for users to 
understand because it can have negative consequences for them.12 
The fact that smart-device companies have access to and control over 
users’ personal data has sparked concern among privacy advocates and 
scholars.13  This is due, in part, to the ability of powerful technology 
companies, which have broad user bases and vast amounts of knowledge 
about their users, to use data in a manipulative way.14  Furthermore, smart-
device users are likely unaware of the many different ways that smart devices 
can collect personal data. 
For example, recent news stories have drawn attention to the ability of the 
Roomba, a smart vacuum, to create a map of the home while cleaning to 
develop a clear path and avoid bumping into stationary objects.15  This 
information could be sold to companies such as Amazon, Apple, Facebook, 
or Google.16  The Roomba not only knows the floor plan of the user’s home 
but also knows the room in which the user’s child sleeps (the one where it 
consistently bumps into toys on the floor) and the room that is missing certain 
furniture.17  Thus, if the data was sold to third parties, the purchasers would 
gain access to information about the consumer, his home, and his lifestyle 
that the purchasers did not originally have access to, which would enable 
them to use that information to their advantage.18 
For instance, with access to the map data, large technology companies 
could develop income estimates on each user or determine how many people 
lived in the home, which would create countless new ways to target the user 
through advertising.19  In fact, an increasingly large part of some companies’ 
business models is simply to sell data to advertisers.20  In addition, the mere 
 
 11. For example, a Canadian vibrator company that connected to the internet via a 
smartphone app was found to be using the app to collect data regarding the use of the device, 
including temperature and intensity settings and how frequently it was used. Jeff John Roberts, 
Sex Toy Maker Pays $3.75 Million to Settle ‘Smart’ Vibrator Lawsuit, FORTUNE (Mar. 10, 
2017), http://fortune.com/2017/03/10/sex-toy-maker-settlement-smart-vibrator-lawsuit/ 
[https://perma.cc/C2LZ-SEJ7].  Ultimately the company agreed to settle for about $3.75 
million to resolve the privacy claims against it. Id. 
 12. See infra Part I.A.3. 
 13. See, e.g., Scott R. Peppet, Regulating the Internet of Things:  First Steps Toward 
Managing Discrimination, Privacy, Security, and Consent, 93 TEX. L. REV. 85, 90–91 (2014). 
 14. See Hillary Brill & Scott Jones, Little Things and Big Challenges:  Information 
Privacy and the Internet of Things, 66 AM. U. L. REV. 1183, 1200–01 (2017) (explaining that 
as the Internet of Things becomes more integrated, data aggregators can pull more information 
from more devices, which makes it easier to piece together a digital profile of someone). 
 15. See, e.g., Maggie Astor, Your Roomba May Be Mapping Your Home, Collecting Data 
That Could Be Shared, N.Y. TIMES (July 25, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/25/ 
technology/roomba-irobot-data-privacy.html [https://perma.cc/VZC6-A3PS].  
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. See id. 
 19. See Bryan Clark, iRobot Wants to Sell Your Floor Plan Data to Amazon, Apple or 
Facebook, NEXT WEB (July 24, 2017, 7:50 PM), https://thenextweb.com/insider/2017/07/25/ 
irobot-wants-to-sell-your-floor-plan-data-to-amazon-apple-or-facebook/ 
[http://perma.cc/8VBR-SQGY].  
 20. See, e.g., Ron Hirson, Uber:  The Big Data Company, FORBES (Mar. 23, 2015, 9:15 
AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ronhirson/2015/03/23/uber-the-big-data-
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collection of data exposes consumers to the potential of the device being 
hacked and having detailed maps of their homes accessible to anyone who 
can break through the product’s privacy protections.21  The capacities of 
these devices raise privacy and security concerns in an area that is generally 
accepted as being the most sacred and private place for an individual:  the 
home. 
Because these devices have the potential to gather, retain, and share a 
significant amount of detailed personal information about users, it is 
imperative that users are fully aware of company policies related to user data 
so that they can choose to accept or reject the terms.22  While average 
consumers may be aware that their devices are connected to the internet, they 
are likely unaware of the type and amount of information that their devices 
are collecting.23  The language in companies’ policies permitting devices to 
gather information is often vague, ambiguous, buried deep in the policy, or 
altogether missing, which leaves consumers completely unaware of what 
they consented to.24  A study of 1900 Internet of Things (“IoT”)25 consumers 
found that 81 percent believed that device manufacturers had not provided 
any details about how their personal information was used.26 
This Note’s purpose is to investigate and evaluate consumer protection 
currently in place for smart devices.  Due to the increasing ubiquity of smart 
devices in the home, and their evolving ability to collect personal 
information, this Note examines the effectiveness of the current notice-and-
choice27 approach to privacy law in the United States.  Part I of this Note 
provides an overview of smart devices prevalent in homes today.  This Part 
discusses the IoT, the capabilities of smart devices, and the current notice-
and-choice approach to consumer privacy law in the United States.  This Part 
also examines current IoT privacy policies to evaluate whether users are 
given true “notice” regarding how and why their information is collected, 
which enables them to make an informed “choice” about whether they want 
to use the product. 
 
company/#1c62f37b18c7 [http://perma.cc/5YGZ-HZ6R] (discussing how Uber uses vast 
quantities of user data it collects about people, including where they live, where they work, 
and when they travel, to generate revenue by selling the data to others). 
 21. See Thomas Fox-Brewster, Time to Update Your Vacuum Cleaner—Hack Turns LG 
Robot Hoover into a Spy, FORBES (Oct. 26, 2017, 9:00 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2017/10/26/lg-hom-bot-robot-hoover-hacked-
into-surveillance-device [http://perma.cc/6U25-QUEQ] (explaining how a design malfunction 
in another robotic vacuum cleaner brand exposed the device to hackers and potential spies).  
 22. See Joel R. Reidenberg et al., Disagreeable Privacy Policies:  Mismatches Between 
Meaning and Users’ Understanding, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 39, 41–42 (2015) (discussing 
the United States’ approach to internet privacy relying on “notice and choice”). 
 23. See id. at 83. 
 24. See Peppet, supra note 13, at 140–47. 
 25. See infra Part I.A. 
 26. PONEMON INST., PRIVACY AND SECURITY IN A CONNECTED LIFE:  A STUDY OF U.S. 
CONSUMERS 7 (2015), http://www.trendmicro.de/media/report/ponemon-privacy-and-security 
-in-a-connected-life-us-consumers-report-en.pdf [http://perma.cc/V933-A6N3]. 
 27. See infra Part I.C. 
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Part II explores the current law that protects consumers who purchase and 
use smart devices within the home.28  This Part discusses current laws that 
may protect consumers whose privacy is violated due to inadequate “notice 
and choice.”  Although consumers often unknowingly agree to the privacy 
policies of smart devices as soon as they begin to use them, this Note argues 
that, as technological advances create increasingly pervasive smart devices, 
consumers will require greater protections to ensure that they can make the 
informed choices necessary for adequate consent.  Part III proposes a 
resolution by arguing that consumer protection statutes should be 
implemented at the state level initially in order to determine the best way to 
regulate the IoT.  These statutes should mandate explicit requirements for 
smart-device companies to include in their privacy policies to give consumers 
an adequate understanding of how their data is being used, thus enabling 
them to make truly informed choices about whether to use a particular device. 
I.  SETTING THE SCENE:  PRIVACY 
AND SECURITY IN THE ERA OF THE IOT 
In 1999, Kevin Ashton, executive director of Auto-ID Labs at MIT, 
became the first person to describe the IoT.  He explained that the future of 
the internet would be in devices that could collect data without human 
assistance to maximize efficiency, cut costs, and reduce waste.29  Today, less 
than twenty years later, the IoT has become a reality.  By 2020 there will be 
an estimated twenty-one billion connected devices worldwide,30 an increase 
of nearly 250 percent from 2017.31  With this sharp increase in an entirely 
new market comes many legal questions related to consumer privacy and 
security. 
This Part provides an overview of the IoT and legal concerns that arise 
from it.  Part I.A describes the IoT.  Part I.B introduces the Roomba robotic 
vacuum cleaner, which this Note uses as an illustration because of its unique 
capability to collect personal data.  Part I.C explains the history and standards 
of the notice-and-choice approach to privacy law in the United States.  
Finally, Part I.D expresses the importance of privacy policies for the notice-
 
 28. Fourth Amendment privacy protection within the home is beyond this Note’s scope.  
This Note instead focuses on consumer protection. 
 29. Keith D. Foote, A Brief History of the Internet of Things, DATAVERSITY (Aug. 16, 
2016), http://www.dataversity.net/brief-history-internet-things/ [http://perma.cc/BB3P-
VXBL] (“The problem is, people have limited time, attention, and accuracy.  All of which 
means they are not very good at capturing data about things in the real world.  If we had 
computers that knew everything there was to know about things, using data they gathered 
without any help from us, we would be able to track and count everything and greatly reduce 
waste, loss and cost.  We would know when things needed replacing, repairing or recalling 
and whether they were fresh or past their best.”). 
 30. Julia Boorstin, An Internet of Things That Will Number Ten Billions, CNBC (Feb. 1, 
2016, 10:52 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2016/02/01/an-internet-of-things-that-will-number-
ten-billions.html [http://perma.cc/7Y8E-R3YS]. 
 31. See Press Release, Gartner, Inc., Gartner Says 8.4 Billion Connected ‘Things’ Will Be 
in Use in 2017, Up 31 Percent from 2016 (Feb. 7, 2017), http://www.gartner.com/ 
newsroom/id/3598917 [http://perma.cc/EF72-SQ9P]. 
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and-choice approach to be effective and examines common shortcomings of 
privacy policies for smart devices. 
A.  The IoT 
This Part provides an overview of the IoT.  Part I.A.1 discusses smart 
devices and highlights the different types of smart devices that are available, 
the benefits of using them, and why the smart device market is growing.  Part 
I.A.2 then explains how smart devices work and how they fit into the IoT.  
Next, Part I.A.3 discusses the overarching risks associated with smart 
devices. 
1.  The Technology 
Smart devices are everyday objects that have embedded sensors allowing 
the devices to collect and send data about the individuals who use the device 
and their surroundings to a sensor system.32  For consumers, smart devices 
are available in numerous contexts.  For health and fitness, Fitbits and similar 
devices are wearable technology that can track health, fitness, and eating 
habits.  Smart devices in the home include smart vacuum cleaners that can 
automatically sweep at scheduled intervals, smart refrigerators that can detect 
and notify a user when they are about to run out of a product, smart 
thermostats that can control the temperature of the home based on the weather 
and the time of day, and smart lights that can self-adjust based on occupancy 
and available sunlight.  Smart home devices are also available in the form of 
voice-activated assistants such as the Amazon Echo and Google Home, both 
of which can set reminders for users, answer user questions, and control other 
smart devices.  While all smart devices share the characteristic of 
communicating data about their users to sensor systems,33 this Note uses 
smart home devices as an illustration.  Smart home devices are uniquely 
positioned to gather highly personal and intimate data about consumers and 
their habits implicating numerous privacy and security concerns. 
Despite these concerns, it is undoubtedly true that smart devices present 
significant benefits to consumers who use them.34  First, the devices are 
 
 32. Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The “Smart” Fourth Amendment, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 
547, 554 (2017); Jamie Lee Williams, Privacy in the Age of the Internet of Things, HUM. RTS., 
2016, at 14, 14 .  There is no formal definition for a smart device.  Some argue that they 
encompass virtual things, in addition to physical things such as people. See, e.g., Guido Noto 
La Diega & Ian Walden, Contracting for the ‘Internet of Things’:  Looking into the Nest, EUR. 
J.L. & TECH., Sept. 2016, at 1, 2.  In this Note, however, a smart device will refer to everyday 
objects with embedded sensors used to collect and communicate data. 
 33. See, e.g., Ferguson, supra note 32, at 554; Williams, supra note 32, at 14. 
 34. See infra text accompanying notes 35–40.  In fact, a recent study of smart home-device 
owners found that 26 percent bought their first device in order to “increase overall 
convenience, improve their quality of life, or help them be more productive.” PWC, SMART 
HOME, SEAMLESS LIFE:  UNLOCKING A CULTURE OF CONVENIENCE 7 (2017), 
https://www.pwc.com/us/en/industry/entertainment-media/publications/consumer-
intelligence-series/assets/pwc-consumer-intelligence-series-iot-connected-home.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/7TQ3-XD55].  Yet, to reap the benefits of smart devices, consumers make a 
trade-off of their privacy. See infra Part I.A.3.a. 
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convenient.35  Users can remotely access their devices or preprogram them 
to work without any further interaction.36  Smart home devices also enable 
energy efficiency.37  Products such as smart lights and smart thermostats can 
automatically adjust based on current needs within the home.38  In addition, 
certain smart home devices can promote security through video monitoring, 
motion detection, smart locks, and smart doorbells.39  Finally, users of smart 
devices gain insights about their habits within the home by tracking 
information such as how often their lights are left on, the types of food they 
keep in their refrigerator, and what times of day they watch television, which 
can ultimately help them change unwanted habits.40 
The conveniences of smart devices coupled with the fact that “new 
efficiencies have pushed down the cost of sensors and new innovations have 
improved the communication capacities of low-power devices” has resulted 
in substantial growth in consumer smart devices.41  One information-
technology analyst firm estimates that there are currently 8.4 billion 
connected devices in use worldwide, up 31 percent from 2016.42  By 2020, 
the firm predicts that there will be over 20.4 billion connected devices.43  
Furthermore, the number of smart home devices delivered worldwide 
increased 64 percent between 2015 and 2016.44  Thus, as the availability and 
interconnectivity of these devices grow, they will become more prevalent 
among average homeowners looking to modernize and maximize 
efficiency.45  As these devices become commonplace in homes, it is critically 
important that users understand how the devices work and their associated 
risks. 
 
 35. See The Advantages of a Smart House, SFGATE, http://homeguides.sfgate.com/ 
advantages-smart-house-8670.html [http://perma.cc/8K5L-RBH3] (last visited Mar. 15, 
2018). 
 36. See id. 
 37. See 6 Benefits of Smart Home Technology, AM. FAM. INS., https://www.amfam.com/ 
resources/articles/at-home/six-benefits-of-smart-home-technology [http://perma.cc/T5VV-
GA4Y] (last visited Mar. 15, 2018). 
 38. See id. 
 39. See id. 
 40. See The 7 Greatest Advantages of Smart Home Automation, BLUE SPEED AV BLOG 
(June 14, 2016), http://www.bluespeedav.com/blog/item/7-greatest-advantages-of-smart-
home-automation [http://perma.cc/7JLT-KFZ8].   
 41. Ferguson, supra note 32, at 556. 
 42. See Press Release, Gartner, Inc., supra note 31. 
 43. See id.  Thus, in our lifetime, we may see 
a future that includes “smart” refrigerators that sense when you are out of milk; 
smart clocks that alert your smart coffee machine that it’s time to start the morning 
brew; smart cars that automatically notify your smart thermostat that you are almost 
home; smart sheets that track your restlessness; smart glucose monitors that send 
signals directly to your doctor; smart light switches, ovens, security systems, 
toothbrushes, and toilets. 
Williams, supra note 32, at 14. 
 44. Diana Olick, Why 2017 Will Finally Be the Year of the Smart Home:  Consumers 
Figure It Out, CNBC (Jan. 4, 2017, 8:03 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/01/04/why-2017-
will-finally-be-the-year-of-the-smart-home-consumers-figure-it-out.html 
[http://perma.cc/BRU9-FKME].  
 45. See id. 
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2.  Internet Connection 
The convenience and efficiency promised by smart devices is the result of 
their internet connectivity.  Smart devices function through embedded 
sensors that are connected to the internet, which enable them to collect and 
transmit data without human interaction.46  In addition to the sensor 
technology, the devices also rely on existing wireless networking systems 
such as Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, and GPS.47 
As more devices have the ability to communicate through internet 
connectivity, society is transitioning into a world full of smart devices, 
known as the IoT.48  The FTC has defined the IoT as “an interconnected 
environment where all manner of objects have a digital presence and the 
ability to communicate with other objects and people.”49  Similarly, legal 
analysts describe the IoT as “the network of everyday physical objects that 
surround us and are increasingly being embedded with technology to enable 
those objects to collect and transmit data about their use and surroundings.”50  
As the IoT grows, and smart devices make their way into homes, many 
believe that this technology will operate quietly in the background as it 
seamlessly integrates into our everyday lives.51 
3.  Data Collection, Device Functionality, and Risks for Consumers 
As consumers purchase smart devices and connect them with one another, 
increasing amounts of data about the consumer become available.52  Smart-
device companies consider data collection to be necessary for the 
effectiveness and proper functionality of the device.53  For example, as 
 
 46. See Williams, supra note 32, at 14. 
 47. See Adam D. Thierer, The Internet of Things and Wearable Technology:  Addressing 
Privacy and Security Concerns Without Derailing Innovation, RICH. J.L. & TECH., Winter 
2015, at 1, 8–9. 
 48. See Peter M. Lefkowitz, Making Sense of the Internet of Things, 59 BOS. B.J. 23, 23 
(2015).   
 49. FTC, INTERNET OF THINGS:  PRIVACY AND SECURITY IN A CONNECTED WORLD 1 (2015), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-staff-report-
november-2013-workshop-entitled-internet-things-privacy/150127iotrpt.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/83MA-ED9N].   
 50. Amy Collins et al., The Internet of Things Part 1:  Brave New World, MORRISON 
FOERSTER:  SOCIALLY AWARE (Apr. 2, 2014), https://www.sociallyawareblog.com/2014/ 
04/02/the-internet-of-things-part-1-brave-new-world-2/ [http://perma.cc/ESQ7-PSKA].  
 51. See Thierer, supra note 47, at 9. 
 52. See Brill & Jones, supra note 14, at 1199. 
 53. See, e.g., Privacy Notice, AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/ 
display.html?nodeId=468496#GUID-1B2BDAD4-7ACF-4D7A-8608-CBA6EA897FD3 
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Amazon’s Alexa becomes more familiar with the user’s voice, it can respond 
to requests more accurately and consistently.54  Similarly, a device such as 
the Nest Thermostat becomes more effective when it is familiar with the 
user’s heating and cooling preferences.55  While data collection may be 
important to the device’s functionality, it also presents privacy and security 
concerns.  Part I.A.3.a outlines data privacy concerns while Part I.A.3.b 
discusses data security concerns. 
a.  Data Privacy 
The constant collection of a vast amount of consumer data has led to a 
growing market for such information.56  The sensors on smart devices can 
collect information about a user’s lifestyle, habits, and preferences, which, 
once analyzed, has the potential to provide useful information to third 
parties.57 
For large technology companies, much of the data collected by smart 
devices has become incredibly valuable because the information garnered 
from the data paints a detailed picture of the consumer.58  Many powerful 
technology companies are investing in IoT not only to sell products but also 
to gather data from those products.59  Having insight about a consumer’s 
daily habits could give companies a competitive advantage through specific 
and targeted advertising.60  Furthermore, as smart devices become more 
integrated with one another through the IoT, data profiles on consumers will 
become more comprehensive.61  Thus, as data aggregation occurs, and 
companies pull increasing amounts of information from users’ devices, 
“personal control over one’s information wanes and the security and privacy 
risks for an individual’s personal information grows.”62 
Not only does the detailed and personal information expose consumers to 
targeted advertising and marketing, it also could result in unfair forms of 
 
 54. See Tim Moynihan, Alexa and Google Home Record What You Say.  But What 
Happens to That Data?, WIRED (Dec. 5, 2016, 9:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/ 
2016/12/alexa-and-google-record-your-voice/ [https://perma.cc/LT9D-TRJM] (explaining 
that voice-activated assistants must always be listening to what you say so they can 
differentiate your regular conversations from their wake words, and so they can immediately 
respond when their wake words (i.e., “Alexa”) are called). 
 55. See What Is Auto-Schedule and How Does It Learn?, NEST, 
https://nest.com/support/article/How-does-Auto-Schedule-learn [https://perma.cc/99JA-
C8YS] (last visited Mar. 15, 2018) (discussing how the Nest Thermostat learns your 
preferences over time and remembers them so the user does not have to manually change the 
temperature each day). 
 56. See Ferguson, supra note 32, at 559. 
 57. See Peppet, supra note 13, at 90. 
 58. See id. (“Sensor data capture incredibly rich nuance about who we are, how we 
behave, what our tastes are, and even our intentions. Once filtered through ‘Big Data’ 
analytics, these data are the grist for drawing revealing and often unexpected inferences about 
our habits, predilections, and personalities.”). 
 59. See Ferguson, supra note 32, at 555. 
 60. See id. at 559. 
 61. See Brill & Jones, supra note 14, at 1199. 
 62. Id.  
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discrimination.63  Professor Scott Peppet suggests that potential employers 
could turn to their “commercial partners”64 to gather information about 
employees.65  With access to an individual’s electric utility data, for instance, 
a potential employer could learn how often the individual is at home, when 
the individual sleeps, or whether the individual is energy conscious—
information that could lead to inferences about a candidate and that could 
result in hidden forms of discrimination.66  Lack of sleep “has been linked to 
poor psychological well-being, health problems, poor cognitive performance, 
and negative emotions such as anger, depression, sadness, and fear.”67  Thus, 
a candidate whose sensor reveals that she does not sleep enough may be less 
likely to get a position.68 
Data could also be used in a similar way by insurance providers, creditors, 
and others seeking to gain information about users to make decisions about 
them.69  In the worst-case scenario, usage of this data could result in forms 
of illegal discrimination against protected classes.70  In short, this data 
provides incredibly detailed and nuanced information about users that, when 
shared with outside parties or unintended recipients, could result in unfair 
consequences or outcomes. 
b.  Data Security 
The ability of smart devices to collect data not only implicates privacy 
concerns but also security concerns.71  These risks are intertwined with one 
another because the improper use of data can cause both privacy and security 
harms.72  For many, security is more important than privacy.73  While the 
security risks posed by IoT devices are not novel and include risks that 
existed with traditional computers, the FTC expressed in its 2015 report that 
the risks are exacerbated by IoT devices.74  These risks include “(1) enabling 
 
 63. See Peppet, supra note 13, at 118. 
 64. In this context, a “commercial partner[]” refers to a company (such as an electric utility 
company or an auto insurance company—any company that may have data on the potential 
employee) that has a business relationship with the potential employer. See id. at 120. 
 65. Id. 
 66. See id. at 118. Peppet further suggests that data brokers who accumulate and track 
information about individuals through their internet usage may soon incorporate Internet of 
Things data. Id. at 120. 
 67. See id. at 119. 
 68. See id. 
 69. Id. at 118. 
 70. See id. 
 71. See FTC, supra note 49, at 10–14 (detailing the different types of security risks posed 
by the IoT). 
 72. Part II of this Note discusses the legal framework to address privacy harms rather than 
security harms.  However, due to the pervasive nature of smart devices, this Note argues that 
consumers must be aware of the risks (both privacy and security) associated with the devices 
in order to adequately consent.  Accordingly, when addressing the risks of the IoT, this Note 
discusses both privacy and security.   
 73. See Lefkowitz, supra note 48, at 24.   
 74. FTC, supra note 49, at 10. 
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unauthorized access and misuse of personal information; (2) facilitating 
attacks on other systems; and (3) creating safety risks.”75 
The first risk, enabling unauthorized access and misuse of personal 
information, derives from hackers who are able to access and abuse personal 
information collected and transmitted from a device.76  This is similar to the 
traditional idea of a computer hack, in which a fraudster is able to access a 
user’s information on his computer and exploit it.77  In the case of the smart 
home, smart televisions similarly allow consumers to make purchases, surf 
the internet, or share photos.78  If a security breach occurs, hackers could 
access all of this information and use it themselves.79  Furthermore, in a home 
with multiple smart devices always collecting and sharing personal data, the 
risk of exposure to a hacker who can access and exploit a user’s data 
increases.80 
The risk of facilitating attacks on other systems, such as a denial-of-service 
attack, poses another concern.81  As users become more dependent upon their 
devices, the implications of this concern increase.  A denial-of-service attack 
could result in a situation in which a hacker gains access to a smart home’s 
devices such as smart locks, light bulbs or refrigerator.82  Hackers could 
“threaten to spoil dinner, cut the lights, or lock a homeowner out (or in!) 
unless they get paid.”83  For a user with multiple devices, the ability of a 
hacker to gain control of all the devices and deny service until something is 
done in return could pose serious problems.84 
The third risk, creating safety risks, is arguably the most important type of 
security concern.85  This type of risk relates to devices that are hacked and 
ultimately used in a way not originally intended, which could endanger 
consumers.86  For instance, researchers recently reported that they were able 
to hack an LG app that controlled a robotic vacuum cleaner, the “Hom-Bot 
hoover,” which enabled them to use the video feed to spy on anything in the 
 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 10–11. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 11. 
 79. Id. 
 80. See id. 
 81. Id. at 11–12.  This type of attack is one in which a hacker gains control of a user’s 
device and refuses to give control back until certain conditions are met. 
 82. See Kaveh Waddell, The Extortionist in the Fridge, ATLANTIC (Jan. 6, 2016), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/01/the-extortionist-in-the-
fridge/422742/ [http://perma.cc/X9T5-U2EA]; see also Stuart Madnick, Security Surprises 
Arising from the Internet of Things, FORBES (May 8, 2017, 10:01 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/ciocentral/2017/05/08/security-surprises-arising-from-the-
internet-of-things-iot/#76b31a522495 [http://perma.cc/ZC44-GMFY] (discussing the 
hypothetical situation in which an internet-enabled coffee maker is held to ransom and the 
owner receives a message stating that he will not be able to have his coffee unless he pays the 
hacker five dollars). 
 83. Waddell, supra note 82. 
 84. See FTC, supra note 49, at 12. 
 85. Id. at 10. 
 86. See id. at 12.   
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device’s vicinity.87  They expressed that this hack could compromise other 
devices such as dishwashers, refrigerators, ovens, washing machines, and 
anything else controlled by the LG app.88  The ability to hack into a video 
camera and see what the residents are doing in the privacy of their home 
poses significant security risks.  Examples of similar security risks include a 
hacker directing a smart car drive off of a bridge89 or the forcing of a smart 
insulin pump to no longer deliver medicine.90  These security risks further 
demonstrate that while smart devices and the IoT have the capabilities to 
make daily life easier and more efficient, there are significant risks. 
Victims of an IoT hack or security violation may pursue legal remedies.91  
The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA),92 for instance, is an 
antihacking statute that Congress has essentially expanded to apply to any 
device with a microchip that has some relationship to interstate commerce.93  
While this statute could be useful for punishing hackers of IoT devices, it has 
limitations.  The CFAA sentencing structure distinguishes punishments 
based on harms.94  In certain situations, such as when the crime harms people 
or computers,95 the maximum penalty increases.96  These increased penalties, 
however, do not apply when a hacker causes a social harm, such as spending 
the account owner’s funds after hacking an Amazon account or updating an 
account owner’s social media information to be false or embarrassing.97  In 
situations in which an increased penalty does not apply, there is only a one-
year maximum sentence.98  In these situations, it is unlikely that a potential 
hacker would be deterred by the threat of the one-year maximum penalty 
imposed by CFAA.99  In addition, not only are IoT devices generally easier 
to hack, but it is also more challenging to identify the hacker than it is for 
 
 87. See Fox-Brewster, supra note 21.  
 88. Id. (“[T]he hack goes to show just how an entire home can be exposed to hackers with 
a simple weakness in a mobile application.”). 
 89. See Madnick, supra note 82. 
 90. See FTC, supra note 49, at 12. 
 91. The remainder of this Part provides a broad overview of security laws that could apply 
to IoT devices, while Part II provides a more in-depth analysis of laws related to privacy. 
 92. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012). 
 93. See id. § 1030(e)(1), (e)(2)(B); see also Matthew Ashton, Note, Debugging the Real 
World:  Robust Criminal Prosecution in the Internet of Things, 59 ARIZ. L. REV. 805, 813 
(2017) (examining existing criminal statutes applied to the IoT).   
 94. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 1030. 
 95. See Ashton, supra note 93, at 816–17. 
 96. See 18 U.S.C § 1030(a)(7), (c)(3) (allowing for punishment of up to five years when 
a hacker uses an internet-connected device as a tool for ransom); id. § 1030(c)(4)(A) (allowing 
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computers); id. § 1030(c)(4)(E) (allowing for punishment up to twenty years when a hacker 
attempts to cause or recklessly causes bodily injury); id. § 1030(c)(4)(F) (allowing for 
punishment up to a life sentence when a hacker attempts to cause or recklessly causes death). 
 97. See Ashton, supra note 93, at 817. 
 98. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 1030.  Under the CFAA, criminals who cause a social harm 
by hacking an Amazon account or a social media profile would technically be subject to the 
same one-year maximum sentence as those who share Netflix passwords with one another. 
See Ashton, supra note 93, at 817. 
 99. See Ashton, supra note 93, at 819. 
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traditional internet hacks.100  Thus, a potential hacker who weighs the 
likelihood of getting caught against the low sentence for causing a social 
harm.101 
States also have data-security and data-breach notification laws that could 
be applicable to IoT devices.102  These statutes cover “personal information,” 
which most of the statutes define to include an individual’s first and last 
name, plus another piece of information such as a social security number, 
bank account information, or driver’s license number.103  Thus, a security 
breach that involved the theft of records containing users’ names and their 
sensor data, or just their sensor data, would not trigger the data-breach 
notification laws in the majority of states.104 
Furthermore, the FTC’s authority to regulate a smart-device security 
breach is also limited.105  While it may regulate privacy and security under 
its authority to police “unfair” or “deceptive” practices, its authority to do so 
under these two prongs is quite limited.106  For the FTC to take action under 
the deception prong, it would require the company to make clear and 
unequivocal statements about their security-related promises to the public.107  
For the unfairness prong, the FTC must show that a company injured 
consumers in a way that violates public policy,108 which is possible under 
only a small set of circumstances.109  In short, while some laws may be 
applicable to data-security breaches for IoT devices, the laws have limited 
application and do not sufficiently address all the potential security concerns 
that arise with IoT devices. 
B.  The Modern Smart Home 
The smart-home market is rapidly growing.110  A recent study found that 
the smart-home market is likely to grow at a compounded annual growth rate 
 
 100. See id. 
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of 14.5 percent between 2017 and 2022 and reach $53.45 billion by 2022.111  
Smart home control devices like the Amazon Echo and the Google Home can 
connect with other appliances such as lights, thermostats, refrigerators, 
televisions, and even vacuum cleaners to maximize efficiency within the 
home.112  This Part discusses a specific smart home device, the Roomba 
robotic vacuum cleaner, detailing the device’s history, how it works, the 
information that it collects, and the potential legal questions that arise if data 
from the device were shared with third parties.  The Roomba is used as an 
illustration throughout this Note to demonstrate current legal issues 
implicated by smart home devices. 
The Roomba was released by iRobot in 2002.113  Several different models 
with advanced capabilities have come out since the original model.114  In 
2015, the new Roomba 980 combined intelligent visual navigation, cloud-
connected application control, and increased cleaning power.115  With this 
technology, the Roomba began creating maps of users’ homes.116  The 
Roomba uses simultaneous localization and mapping (SLAM) technology to 
map a user’s home.117  In addition, iRobot recently launched two new 
versions, the Roomba 690 and the Roomba 890, which extended Wi-Fi 
connectivity to the entire Roomba line.118  These newer Roomba models can 
connect with smart assistants such as Amazon’s Alexa so that users can 
control them with voice commands.119 
By using SLAM, the newer models collect data about the home, including 
a map of the layout of the home, what area requires the most cleaning, and 
what area usually has toys on the floor.120  Similar to other smart devices,121 
iRobot’s privacy policy focuses on the fact that enabling the technology of 
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 120. See Jones, supra note 117. 
 121. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
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attention away from privacy concerns.122  Although this data collection may 
enable the Roomba to function more effectively, the prospect of the data 
being sold or shared raises important legal questions.123  Not only would it 
expose consumers to targeted advertising124 based on items that their homes 
have or do not have,125 it could also enable companies to determine the 
owner’s income level by paying attention to the size of the home and the 
amount of furniture within the home.126  One staff attorney at the Electronic 
Frontier Foundation noted that this information, coupled with other data, “is 
going to be able to reveal a ton of information about what people’s lifestyles 
are like, [and] what people’s daily patterns are like.”127 
Furthermore, consider a current homeowner with a Roomba who consents 
to having his data shared.  Suppose that user moves and a new owner moves 
into the home.  A legal question could arise regarding how the previous 
owner’s consent affects the new owner and whether the data about the home 
can be retained.128  In addition, new legal questions may arise if that data 
were shared with law enforcement or insurance companies.129  Consideration 
of these legal questions requires an understanding of how the United States 
addresses issues of consumer data privacy.  The next Part discusses the 
current approach to consumer data privacy in the United States. 
C.  “Notice and Choice” 
Consumer privacy laws in the United States come from multiple sources—
state-law privacy torts, federal statutes, and administrative rules—and are 
thus described as “sectoral.”130  The FTC plays a critical role in regulating 
the collection of consumer data.131  In 1914, Congress created the FTC 
through the Federal Trade Commission Act (FCTA) to protect consumers 
and promote competition.132  Section 5 of the FTCA gives the FTC the 
statutory authority to file complaints against any business that is found to 
have unfair practices related to the management of consumer data.133 
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In the early age of the internet, the FTC addressed online consumer privacy 
issues by promoting a policy of self-regulation.134  In 2000, after a few years 
of studying online privacy issues and promoting the “Fair Information 
Practice Principles” (FIPPs) of “notice,” “choice,” “access,” and “security,” 
the FTC provided further clarification about the policy of self-regulation in a 
report to Congress.135  In the report, the FTC discussed its finding that in a 
survey of website privacy policies, only 20 percent of policies complied at 
least in part with the FIPPs.136  The FTC further noted that the principles of 
“access” and “security” had implementation issues, which makes compliance 
with the principles particularly challenging.137  Therefore, the FTC focused 
on the principles of “notice,” the “most fundamental” principle,138 and 
“choice” separately, and it found that only 41 percent of policies complied 
with the standards.139  While recognizing the continued need for industry 
self-regulation, the FTC expressed that adequate protection of consumer 
privacy online would require Congress to enact legislation.140 
Because Congress declined to enact comprehensive legislation, self-
regulation remains the primary mechanism for addressing issues of consumer 
privacy today.141  Furthermore, the principles of notice and choice have been 
promulgated as critical components to the model.142  Notice requires that 
consumers be given “clear and conspicuous notice of an entity’s information 
practices before any personal information is collected from them.”143  Choice 
entails “giving consumers options as to how any personal information 
collected from them may be used . . . beyond those necessary to complete a 
contemplated transaction.”144  This would include using consumer 
information for marketing additional products or transferring or selling 
consumer data to third parties.145 
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The idea of the current regulatory regime is that as long as companies 
provide accurate information to consumers, and consumers make an 
informed choice to accept or reject the service, self-regulation works.146  
Accordingly, privacy policies are critically important for this model to be 
effective.147  For a consumer to be given adequate notice regarding his data, 
privacy policies must include information regarding who is collecting the 
data, how the data is being used, who may potentially receive the data, 
whether collection of the data is necessary for the device to function, and the 
steps taken by a company to maintain the confidentiality of the data.148  
Without this detailed and thorough explanation of how their data is being 
used, consumers are unable to make an informed choice, and thus the self-
regulatory model breaks down.149  The next Part discusses some of the 
current weaknesses with smart-device privacy policies. 
D.  Shortcomings of Modern Privacy Policies 
Under the current notice-and-choice model, privacy policies are the most 
important source of information for consumers who are attempting to learn 
how companies will use their data.150  For the model to be effective, it is 
critical for consumers to understand the policy to which they are agreeing.  
Despite this important principle, privacy policies are consistently “verbose, 
difficult to understand, take too long to read, and may be the least-read items 
on most websites even as users express growing concerns about information 
collection practices.”151  These problems exist with smart devices’ privacy 
policies as well.152  Thus, with ineffective privacy policies, the notice-and-
choice model fails to work. 
Consumers have become more hesitant to buy smart home devices due to 
security and privacy concerns.153  A recent study found that consumers are 
uncomfortable being “watched, listened to, or tracked by devices they place 
in their homes.”154  The study further found that 40 percent of consumers felt 
that they were not informed about the risks of the device.155  These findings 
highlight the conundrum faced by consumers surrounded by the rapidly 
growing IoT.  While consumers may be excited about the prospect of using 
smart devices and reaping the benefits that they offer, consumers also feel 
that they are not receiving the requisite notice that enables them to make 
informed choices about the devices.  Thus, some consumers may be 
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refraining from the smart market entirely, while others may be entering the 
market unaware of how the devices collect, use, and share data. 
Failure to provide adequate notice to consumers in the form of privacy 
policies results in uninformed choices.  When this occurs, the self-regulatory 
model fails.  This Part highlights common problems with smart-device 
privacy policies and uses iRobot’s privacy policy for the Roomba to illustrate 
these common problems.  Specifically, this Part addresses the difficulty of 
finding smart-device privacy policies, the vague and unclear language 
common within privacy policies, the time constraints of reading privacy 
policies, and, finally, the glaring omissions from privacy policies. 
1.  Location of Smart-Device Privacy Policies 
As one privacy scholar noted, notice and choice for IoT devices is 
inherently complicated because the device’s physical features do not 
facilitate consent.156  The devices—generally small, screenless, and lacking 
an input mechanism—make it challenging to confront a user with a privacy 
policy and to obtain consent.157  If the device cannot display the privacy 
policy, the company is left with the choice of placing the policy in the box 
with the device, on the company’s website, or within a connected mobile 
application.158  This scholar studied twenty IoT devices and their privacy 
policies to learn more about their commonalities and found that none of the 
devices included privacy- or security-related information in the box.159  Nor 
did any of the device boxes contain information pointing the user to the 
privacy policy’s location.160  Thus, by not having a privacy policy in the box 
and not mentioning where to locate the policy, a consumer could be entirely 
unaware of the existence of any privacy policy.161 
The study also found that the overwhelming majority of IoT manufacturers 
preferred to provide the policy on their websites.162  For many of these 
devices, it was unclear whether the privacy policy on the website applied to 
use of the website or the sensor device.163  While some of the policies stated 
that they applied to the use of both the website and the device, others 
 
 156. Peppet, supra note 13, at 140–41.  Upon purchasing a device called a “Breathometer,” 
the consumer was provided with the device and a user manual, but had to go online and search 
for the privacy policy, which was buried deep in the product’s website. Id. at 89–90. 
 157. Id. at 140. 
 158. Id. at 141. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. See id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. at 142.  Peppet examined iHealth, a company that manufactured health devices 
such as a health and sleep monitor, which works through an app. Id. at 141–42.  According to 
Peppet, the policy on the iHealth website, only applied to the use of the website and not to the 
use of the monitor or the app. Id. at 142.  When installing the app, a user encountered a software 
license agreement, which stated that the app may upload personal information and that the use 
of personal data is outlined in the privacy policy. Id.  Despite this, the user was never told 
where the device’s privacy policy could be located. Id.  Thus, “even an interested consumer 
seeking privacy information about iHealth products and sensor data [was] led in an unending 
circle of confusion.” Id.  
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indicated that the privacy policy applied only to the website and that the user 
would need to go elsewhere to read the device’s privacy policy.164  Some 
websites included separate policies, one for the use of the website and one 
for use of the device; while this makes it clear to the consumer what policy 
applies to his or her data, it takes significant time and energy to sift through 
all the information.165  In short, because most companies do not include 
privacy policies for smart devices in the box, users must independently seek 
them out to give fully informed consent.166  Even once the user locates the 
policy, he may be unclear about whether the policy applies to the device.167 
The findings of this study are consistent with the case of the Roomba.  The 
device lacks an input mechanism and thus cannot display a privacy policy.  
Upon opening the box, there is no indication that the device is subject to a 
privacy policy.  To find the privacy policy, the user must go to the iRobot 
website and scroll to the bottom of the page.  Furthermore, while the language 
of the privacy policy indicates that it applies to the device itself—“[t]his 
[p]olicy applies to [iRobot] websites and Service, including 
www.iRobot.com (the “Web Site”), as well as to consumer devices you 
register with [iRobot] Service and to the online applications (“Apps”) which 
provide support for those consumer devices”168—this information is not 
immediately apparent, and it takes time for the consumer to locate. 
2.  Language in Smart-Device Privacy Policies 
A study investigating users’ understanding of privacy policies found that 
52 percent of users incorrectly believe that “[w]hen a company posts a 
privacy policy, it ensures that the company keeps confidential all the 
information it collects on users.”169  In the age of smart devices, this is a 
concerning statistic due to the ability of the devices to collect highly personal 
data.170  Even for a user who is able to locate a privacy policy and is willing 
to read it, understanding it can be incredibly difficult.171  Research has shown 
that high levels of education are often required to understand the verbose and 
legalistic nature of most privacy policies.172  Yet, even for a highly educated 
user who can read the policy, a true understanding may be challenging due 
to the policy’s ambiguity or obscurity.173  One study found that the language 
of privacy policies framed the data-collection practices in a positive light and 
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 165. See id. at 143. 
 166. See id. at 141. 
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 170. See supra text accompanying notes 124–27. 
 171. See Grannis, supra note 130, at 1149. 
 172. See Reidenberg et al., supra note 22, at 46. 
 173. See Grannis, supra note 130, at 1149. 
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neglected to acknowledge their potential invasiveness.174  Similarly, the 
iRobot privacy policy opens with the statement that the purpose of collecting 
“personal information” is to “provide you with a personalized, useful and 
efficient experience.”175 
In addition, the study found that “modal” verbs and adverbs such as “may” 
and “might” were common.  These words downplayed how often companies 
collected data, which resulted in individual interpretation of how that data 
was appropriated.176  In the case of the iRobot privacy policy, the modal verb 
“may” was used more than forty times and granted the service the ability to 
share a user’s information in specific instances177 and to collect and store 
identification numbers unique to the device.178  In addition, the policy 
“reserve[d] the right” to de-identify a user’s personal data, to retain that 
information for their own records, and to modify the policy “from time to 
time,” but it failed to specify when and why that would occur.179  Thus, in 
the case of the Roomba, the frequent use of modal verbs leads to lack of 
clarity around how individual data will be used. 
Furthermore, Scott Peppet’s analysis noted that the language of many 
policies was unclear about whether the data collected counted as “personal 
information,” which led to more confusion about whether the data could be 
shared or sold to third parties.180  The policies often referred to the collection 
of “personal information” but failed to provide a definition.181  For some 
companies, this personal information constituted “personally identifiable 
information,” which is traditionally defined as an individual’s name, address, 
email address, or telephone number.182  Thus, the majority of information 
collected by sensor devices would not be protected by this definition.183  
Some policies include language that would lead a consumer to believe the 
information collected by the device does constitute personal information such 
as “data that can be reasonably linked to a specific individual or 
household.”184  When policies fail to clarify what specifically constitutes 
personal information, or information that is considered nonpersonal 
information, consumers are left wondering how their data will be used.185 
For iRobot, personal information is defined as “information about you or 
associated with you.”186  The policy fails to specify whether information 
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collected by the device constitutes “personal information,” and thus it lacks 
clarity about how that information can be used.187  In addition, while the 
circumstances enumerated in the privacy policy already give the company a 
significant amount of freedom to share the data,188 confusion recently arose 
concerning the chief executive’s expressed interest in selling the data to other 
companies in the coming years.189  While iRobot has since denied that it 
plans to sell user data and rather plans only to share it with consumer 
consent,190 this situation has raised concerns about what “consent” actually 
means.  It is clear that there are already numerous circumstances in which 
consent is not required.191  In short, the language of the iRobot privacy policy 
is consistent with the findings of previous analyses in that it is unclear as to 
what and how consumers’ information is being used.  This lack of clarity 
highlights the ways that smart-device privacy polices fail to provide adequate 
notice and thus exposes the limitations on self-regulation. 
3.  Time Constraints for Reading Privacy Policies 
The majority of consumers fail to pay significant attention to privacy 
policies, despite the fact that they are expected to self-regulate the privacy 
agreements that they are entering into.192  Scholars have noted that 
consumers may choose not to read policies not only because of the verbose 
language but also because of the length.193  Another study found that if 
American consumers were to read every privacy policy that they encountered 
in a year, it would take them approximately 201 hours and cost about $3534 
per American internet user.194  The study concluded that by decreasing the 
amount of time it takes to read a policy, and by limiting the amount of text 
displayed within the policy, consumers would be more likely to read and 
understand it.195  The iRobot privacy policy, for example, is nearly 2900 
words long.196  The length of the iRobot privacy policy, compared with other 
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privacy policies, is average.197  For a person reading at a rate of 250 words 
per minute,198 the iRobot policy would take between eleven and twelve 
minutes to read. 
4.  Omissions from Smart-Device Privacy Policies 
Many privacy policies fail to address important concerns altogether.199  
Numerous privacy policies for smart devices, including that of iRobot, do not 
mention who owns the data that is collected.200  IoT policies often fail to 
specify what data the device collects or lack complete detail about the data.201  
Further, many policies do not specify the security measures that are in place 
to protect the data from security breaches.202 
Because IoT privacy policies are difficult to find, have complex language, 
include terms that are ambiguous or vague, are long and difficult to read, or 
omit information all together, concerns exist about the validity of consumer 
consent.  As noted by the FTC, notice is a prerequisite to choice.203  Thus, by 
not putting a consumer on notice, the consumer likely cannot provide an 
informed choice about whether to use the device.  The problem of not 
receiving the requisite notice and choice is magnified by the limited legal 
remedies for a consumer who suffers a privacy harm.  The next Part explores 
how certain existing legal frameworks may address privacy harms. 
II.  CURRENT STANDARDS AND SHORTCOMINGS 
OF CONSUMER PROTECTION FOR SMART DEVICES 
Notice and choice remains the primary mechanism for regulating the 
collection of consumer data online.204  Although privacy policies should 
enable consumers to self-regulate, investigation shows that they consistently 
fail to adequately equip consumers to make informed choices about their 
data.205  The question thus arises:  What are the legal options for consumers 
who experience privacy-related harms? 
This Part explores the current laws and legal remedies available.  Part II.A 
discusses common law contract theory and whether privacy policies 
constitute legally binding contracts.  Part II.B discusses existing state and 
federal privacy statutes that may protect smart-device users.  Part II.C then 
explains the FTC’s role under section 5 to take enforcement action against 
companies that engage in unfair or deceptive trade practices.  Ultimately, this 
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Part highlights the lack of legal remedies available to consumers who have 
suffered a privacy-related harm, which leaves them vulnerable. 
A.  Privacy Policies as Legally Binding Contracts 
The idea that parties have a “freedom to contract” is central to contract 
theory.  Having “the ability to enter into contracts is traditionally viewed as 
a ‘fundamental’ right because it reflects the parties’ liberties to control the 
disposition of their property and alter their legal relationships.”206  Thus, 
contracts allow parties to create and structure an agreement on their own 
terms and solidify that agreement in the law.207  For that reason, the principle 
of effective notice has been central to common law contracts because without 
notice or knowledge of the terms, a party to a contract cannot structure the 
agreement on his terms.208  Further, if a party does not have effective notice 
at the formation stage, the contract may be deemed unenforceable.209  Under 
this common notion of contract theory, many IoT privacy policies that are 
elusive, vague, unclear, lengthy, or that leave out critical information could 
be deemed not to provide effective notice, thus making them unenforceable 
on the terms that are unclear.210 
While this line of thinking may seem logical, privacy policies have 
consistently been found to not carry legally binding weight.211  Although 
little case law existed on the subject in the early age of the internet when 
privacy policies became common, some scholars believed that contract law 
would play a large role in their enforcement.212  As case law began to 
develop, however, plaintiffs had difficulty alleging viable breach-of-contract 
claims against companies that engaged in practices different from those 
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outlined in their privacy policies.213  In these cases, courts have consistently 
taken the view that privacy policies are a mere statement of a company’s 
policy and thus do not give rise to a viable contract claim.214  Courts often 
follow this reasoning by expressing that even if the policy constituted a viable 
contract, the plaintiffs failed to establish damages—a critical element to a 
breach-of-contract claim.215  In short, courts typically do not find privacy 
policies to be contractually binding.216  Even if they did, however, plaintiffs 
would often have difficulty alleging viable damages.217 
Another reason courts may reject contract claims for breaching a privacy 
policy is based on the form of the privacy policy.218  End-user license 
agreements (EULAs) are contracts used by internet-based providers that 
outline the services and functionalities a consumer may expect from a 
product and that establish a consumer’s right to use the product or service.219  
EULAs are usually drafted by the party with the stronger bargaining power 
and are assented to by the party with weaker bargaining power, usually the 
consumer.220  In addition, EULAs are generally required at the point of 
sale.221  This disparity in bargaining power results in consumers having little, 
if any, say over the terms of EULAs.222 
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Clickwrap and browsewrap are forms of EULAs.223  A clickwrap 
agreement is one that is intended to garner express consent from those that 
use a website by requiring them to click on an icon to indicate that they agree 
to the website’s terms.  These types of agreements have consistently been 
upheld by courts as enforceable when the user has assented,224 even if the 
user did not read the agreement.225  Under these circumstances, the user has 
clearly been informed of and willing accepted the terms, which satisfies the 
common law principle of notice.  By comparison, browsewrap agreements, 
in which a website displays its terms of use at the bottom of the webpage and 
considers further use of the webpage to constitute acceptance of the 
agreement, are typically unenforceable due to the difficulty of establishing a 
clear manifestation of assent by the user.226 
A smart-device privacy policy typically takes the form of a browsewrap 
agreement because the user is expected to read and understand the policy on 
his own, and there is no explicit manifestation of assent to the outlined policy.  
Users can choose to view the policy or ignore it.227  Structuring privacy 
policies in a browsewrap format—without the contracting principle of mutual 
assent—makes formation of a contract nearly impossible to establish.228  
Furthermore, companies often seek to establish another layer of protection 
for themselves by including in their terms that the privacy policy is merely a 
statement of policy and not a contract.229 
The doctrine of promissory estoppel has failed to be an effective means of 
bringing a breach-of-contract claim for privacy policies.230  Promissory 
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estoppel is meant to protect those who rely on promises to their detriment, 
even when the essential elements of a contract are not met, by enforcing the 
promise.231  In privacy-related actions, the few plaintiffs alleging 
promissory-estoppel claims have failed due to their inability to show 
detrimental reliance.232 
In short, although contract law may seem like a logical and reasonable 
means for enforcing privacy policies, the limited case law on the subject 
shows the challenges that arise for plaintiffs bringing these claims.  Since 
privacy policies are generally not contractual in nature or form, courts 
typically find that they are expressions of policy and thus do not have 
contractually binding weight.  Furthermore, due to the way policies are 
drafted, plaintiffs have difficulty showing reliance to their detriment on a 
policy, which causes contractual claims to fail.  As a result, both formal 
contract law and promissory estoppel are rarely used in privacy-related 
actions and thus are not effective legal measures for smart-device users 
whose privacy has been violated.  The next Part investigates and discusses 
relevant legislation that applies to privacy-related harms. 
B.  Sectoral Legislation of Privacy Law 
U.S. privacy law is sectoral and is created through different laws, which 
regulate different industries and economic sectors.233  This is distinct from 
the approach in many other industrialized nations in which one overarching 
statute regulates the use of all personal information, irrespective of who 
wishes to use that information.234  This Part first discusses federal laws that 
address privacy-related harms and then examines state laws. 
1.  Federal Legislation 
In the United States, Congress has passed a number of sectoral statutes that 
protect specific types of information.235  This approach draws fine 
distinctions between the collection of similar types of information.236  For 
instance, several different laws govern financial data.237  The Fair Credit 
Reporting Act protects credit information and how that information is 
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reported,238 while the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act requires companies that 
provide financial products to explain their information-sharing practices.239  
Different laws regulate our health and medical information,240 such as the 
Health Information Portability and Accountability Act, which protects our 
medical information,241 and the Health Information Technology for 
Economic and Clinical Health Act, which regulates the protection of 
electronic health records.242  In addition, information relating to children has 
varying legislative protections, such as the Family Educational Rights and 
Privacy Act, which protects students’ educational records,243 and the 
Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act, which regulates data privacy 
relating to children.244 
These statutes cover limited and specific types of information and will not 
cover a significant amount of data that is collected by smart devices.245  Thus, 
there is no federal statute that regulates the general collection of consumer 
data, which leaves the massive amounts of data collected by IoT devices to 
be addressed at the state level or through regulatory agencies. 
2.  State Legislation 
State law is another area where certain privacy rights are recognized for 
citizens of that state with the potential to protect consumer data.246  In a recent 
article, Professor Danielle Keats Citron highlighted the critical role of state 
attorneys general in privacy enforcement.247  She noted that in the 1990s, 
when the FTC was promoting the self-regulation model for privacy 
enforcement, state attorneys general were promoting the adoption of FIPPs 
as part of consumer protection laws.248  With this encouragement, states 
enacted unfair and deceptive trade acts and practices laws (known as “UDAP 
laws”).249  State attorneys general may enforce UDAP laws by seeking civil 
penalties, injunctive relief, and attorneys’ fees and costs.250  As states have 
passed more specific privacy and security laws, the enforcement power of 
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attorneys general has expanded, but UDAP laws remain central to privacy 
enforcement.251 
States regulate privacy differently, with some regulating it explicitly and 
others regulating it through UDAP laws.252  In California, a leading state in 
protecting online privacy, privacy is classified as a fundamental right.253  The 
California Online Privacy Protection Act of 2003 imposes stringent standards 
on businesses collecting user information.254  The law requires that websites 
that collect “personally identifiable information”255 must “conspicuously” 
post a privacy policy256 and comply with that policy.257  It also requires that 
the privacy policy outline the categories of personally identifiable 
information that are being collected about individual users and the third 
parties with whom the information is shared.258  Furthermore, because the 
law applies to any website that would be used by people in California, it 
essentially requires privacy policies nationwide.259 
Similarly, Delaware requires that an enterprise that collects personally 
identifiable information about users residing in Delaware, such as “[a]n 
operator of a commercial [i]nternet website, online or cloud computing 
service, online application, or mobile application,” must “make its privacy 
policy conspicuously available.”260  In addition, in 2017, Nevada enacted a 
law that requires operators of websites or online services that collect 
personally identifiable information from those residing in Nevada to inform 
consumers about how their information is being used.261 
Both Minnesota and Nevada require internet service providers to keep 
personal information regarding their customers confidential.262  In addition, 
Nebraska and Pennsylvania have amended their unfair-business-practice 
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statutes to prohibit knowingly making a false or misleading statement in a 
privacy policy.263 
California and Utah both enacted legislation requiring all businesses, 
online or not, to inform consumers when they plan to sell or share their 
personal information to a third party.264  California’s “Shine the Light” law 
requires all nonfinancial businesses to either allow customers to opt out of 
information sharing or to disclose to customers the types of information it 
shares or sells to third parties for direct marketing.265  Utah enacted similar 
legislation, which mandates that a business may not share nonpublic personal 
information about a consumer to a third party for compensation unless the 
business provides specific notice to the consumer.266 
While these laws mark a step in the right direction for ensuring adequate 
privacy protection for consumers of smart devices, they come short of 
addressing all of the concerns.  By mandating privacy policies, states like 
California and Delaware are going further than the FTC by effectively 
requiring privacy policies nationwide.267  However, mandating these policies 
does not eliminate many of the problems associated with smart-device 
privacy policies.268  Even if a company “conspicuously” posts its policy, it 
may avoid litigation by keeping the policy vague, failing to address certain 
issues, or failing to notify the consumer of the policy. 
The same issue arises with laws prohibiting false or misleading statements 
such as those in Nebraska and Pennsylvania.269  Companies can find their 
way around being deemed false or misleading simply by keeping information 
vague.  The Shine the Light law also has limitations.270  For instance, the law 
limits “direct marketing purposes” to specific types of solicitations made to 
consumers, and it does not include ads on websites or phones or collection 
by data brokers.271  In addition, the disclosure requirement is only mandated 
upon request,272 and the enforcement of the law has been found to be 
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inconsistent.273  Thus, while these laws are effective in certain ways, they 
have limitations and fail to achieve comprehensive privacy legislation for 
smart devices. 
While privacy concerns for smart devices are not fully addressed at the 
state level, it is clear that the state has the potential to impact privacy laws in 
a meaningful way.274  State attorneys general are uniquely positioned to 
address issues of security and privacy because they are on the front lines and 
can address local conditions and concerns related to privacy through 
legislation, education, and enforcement.275  In addition, at the state level, 
there are fewer bureaucratic requirements, which makes it easier and quicker 
to move forward on initiatives.276  Further, because state attorneys general 
are directly accountable to voters, they are more likely to address the privacy 
and security concerns of their voters.277 
C.  The Federal Trade Commission 
Due to the sectoral nature of laws regulating privacy in the United States 
and the fact that the data collected by smart devices is not subject to a 
particular law,278 data falls under the statutory authority of the FTC.279  The 
FTC’s authority is broad and overlapping and includes the ability to protect 
consumers who have been the victims of privacy related claims and to take 
action against companies nationwide.280  Despite its broad jurisdiction, its 
ability to make policy or to enforce laws is limited to either enforcement 
under section 5 or informal guidance through reports, guidelines, and press 
releases.281  While important, these types of informal guidance are not 
generally binding and are instead considered best practices or “soft law”; 
thus, they are not useful for a victim of a privacy harm.282  Accordingly, this 
Part will focus on the FTC’s enforcement authority under section 5. 
Under section 5, the FTC has authority to take action against “unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.”283  When the FTC 
takes action against a business, it prepares a complaint, which serves as the 
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basis of a settlement or, in rare cases, the initiation of litigation.284  If the FTC 
is successful, it issues a consent order containing provisions binding the 
defendant, namely, injunctive relief against continued violations, reporting 
and auditing requirements, or financial penalties.285  While consent orders 
are not considered law and are only binding on the business that enters into 
them, they often have precedential value as other companies follow them to 
avoid similar charges.286 
The number of privacy-enforcement actions has been increasing since the 
early 2000s, which is likely the result of the increasing number of companies 
that collect and share consumer information.287  Unfair acts or practices 
consist of analyzing whether the act “causes or is likely to cause substantial 
injury to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers 
themselves and not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or 
to competition.”288  The majority of FTC section 5 enforcement actions 
addressing issues of consumer privacy are not brought under the unfairness 
prong due to the “substantial injury” requirement.289  Under the “substantial 
injury” requirement, emotional harm is likely not considered to be substantial 
enough to qualify, and only monetary harm or risks to health and safety will 
be sufficient.290  Thus, the FTC has been successful in enforcement actions 
using the unfairness prong in situations involving the “unauthorized 
disclosure of (1) directly-identifiable personal information (2) that is clearly 
‘sensitive.’”291 
Deceptive practices occur when a “representation, omission or practice 
that is likely to mislead the consumer acting reasonably in the circumstances 
to the consumer’s detriment.”292  Cases in which the FTC seeks enforcement 
action under its section 5 authority have been more common under the 
deception prong.293  The FTC has expressed that a misleading practice that 
would rise to the level of being “material” is one that would be likely to affect 
 
 284. See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 131, at 609–10.  The vast majority of FTC 
enforcement actions end in settlement agreements.  One of the main reasons that companies 
elect to settle with the FTC rather than go to court is because doing so allows them to avoid 
admitting wrongdoing. Id. at 610. 
 285. See id. at 613–14. 
 286. See id. at 620. 
 287. See Grannis, supra note 130, at 1116. 
 288. 15 U.S.C. § 45(n). 
 289. See Brill & Jones, supra note 14, at 1210–12. 
 290. See FTC, Policy Statement on Unfairness (Dec. 17, 1980), 
https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/1980/12/ftc-policy-statement-unfairness 
[https://perma.cc/5T5K-YHEJ] (expressing the limited circumstances where emotional harms 
could be considered to cause “substantial injury”). 
 291. Brill & Jones, supra note 14, at 1211; see, e.g., Complaint Counsel’s Proposed 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 1, In re LabMD, Inc., No. 9357, 2015 WL 
4967222 (F.T.C. Aug. 10, 2015) (alleging that sensitive health information failed to be 
adequately protected from unauthorized disclosure). 
 292. FTC, Policy Statement on Deception (Oct. 14, 1983), https://www.ftc.gov/public-
statements/1983/10/ftc-policy-statement-deception [http://perma.cc/T99S-AXYW]. 
 293. See JOEL R. REIDENBERG ET AL., PRIVACY HARMS AND THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE 
NOTICE AND CHOICE FRAMEWORK 20 (2014), http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/students/groups/ 
is/files/2015/01/Privacy-Harms-and-Notice-and-Choice-01-12-2015-1-4.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/DC97-NYJR]. 
2018] PRIVACY & SECURITY IN THE SMART HOME 2543 
a reasonable consumer’s choice regarding his or her use of a product.294  The 
FTC has brought enforcement actions against businesses under the deceptive 
prong when companies act in a misleading way, such as by failing to adhere 
to the promises laid out in their privacy policies.295 
The problem with the standard granting authority to the FTC under section 
5 is that situations under which the FTC can file a complaint are relatively 
limited.296  The language of “unfair or deceptive” essentially requires the 
FTC to catch a company in a lie, unless there was a monetary or health-related 
harm, because the Commission still lacks the explicit authority to generally 
protect online consumer privacy.297  In addition, the FTC cannot mandate 
that companies have privacy policies, which “leads to the curious situation 
whereby a company without a privacy policy is arguably less likely to be 
punished for privacy invasive practices than a company with a privacy 
policy.”298  Although most companies now have some form of privacy 
policy,299 companies that are simply vague about their commitments to 
privacy or that have a general privacy policy typically will be immune from 
action under section 5 authority.300 
Many companies, such as iRobot, maintain these vague policies301 and 
thus would not be subject to a complaint by the FTC.  Thus, without a grant 
of more statutory authority, the FTC will remain tied to the language of 
section 5, and even a flexible interpretation of the statute will limit its 
applicability IoT manufacturers.302  In short, because the FTC’s reach is 
limited, and it only has the legal authority to take action against companies 
who are explicitly misleading or who cause specific types of harm, it lets 
companies with vague or ambiguous policies, including many IoT 
companies, off the hook entirely. 
III.  A PROPOSAL TO IMPLEMENT MANDATORY 
STATE-LEVEL REQUIREMENTS FOR SMART DEVICES  
By applying the legal framework for privacy law discussed in Part II to the 
smart devices outlined in Part I, this Note recognizes that the current model 
of self-regulation is insufficient to protect consumers who use smart 
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devices.303  Due to the collection of vast amounts of data about individuals, 
their habits, and their lifestyle by smart devices, and the fact that most smart-
device privacy policies fail to provide adequate notice to consumers about 
what they can expect from their devices, user choice is often ill informed.304  
Yet, an ill-informed user who suffers a privacy harm and seeks legal redress 
is often left empty-handed, absent very specific circumstances.  As the IoT 
grows at an exponential rate with minimal legal regulation surrounding it, 
this Note recommends greater consumer protection to ensure consumers can 
make informed choices regarding devices that collect their personal data.  
Accordingly, this Note argues that state governments are in the best position 
to address the rapidly growing IoT and to mandate specific requirements for 
IoT companies that collect user data.  First, Part III.A addresses existing 
scholarship and proposals for IoT regulation and explains why these 
proposals are insufficient.  Next, Part III.B proposes specific ways that state 
governments can regulate smart devices to better protect consumers and 
highlights why state governments are in the best position to address the IoT. 
A.  Existing Scholarship and Proposals for Regulating the IoT 
Due to the rate at which the IoT is growing and the lack of a legal 
framework regulating data collected by smart devices, there has been an 
influx of legal scholarship about how to best regulate IoT privacy and 
security practices.305  While scholars have formed nuanced perspectives on 
the issue, the overarching categories for regulation of the IoT generally fall 
into three distinct camps.306  The first camp, the “free-market approach,” 
advocates sparse regulation of the IoT and argues that regulations will stifle 
innovation and economic competition.307  In this view, privacy concerns are 
not salient enough to merit IoT regulation.308  The second camp, the “FTC 
approach,” highlights the important role of the FTC in providing guidance 
for IoT companies and argues that section 5’s enforcement authority should 
be the means for prosecuting IoT companies that cause harm to consumers 
due to poor data-related practices.309  The final camp, and the one advocated 
in this Note, takes an “activist approach.”  This camp argues that due to the 
pervasive nature of smart devices and the insufficient legal framework to 
regulate them, legislation must be enacted to protect consumers.310 
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The free-market approach stresses self-regulation and industry best 
practices to regulate the IoT.311  The theory underlying this approach is that 
regulating a growing industry such as the IoT will ultimately “constrain 
innovation and prevent the development of technologies with substantial 
social and economic benefits.”312  While the theory of the free-market 
approach and its goal of promoting innovation are laudable, these benefits do 
not outweigh the rights of consumers.  As has been shown, IoT privacy 
policies make it difficult for consumers to make informed choices and, thus, 
to self-regulate.313  Without enforcement action against companies that fail 
to provide consumers with adequate information, IoT companies will 
continue to fail to adequately inform consumers of how their data is being 
used, and consumers will be left legally empty-handed and vulnerable. 
Proponents of the FTC approach, by contrast, focus on maintaining the 
long-standing practices used to protect consumers in the age of the 
internet.314  These practices include using the self-regulatory model of notice 
and choice,315 using informal guidance documents such as reports and press 
releases to outline best practices for companies that collect data,316 and using 
its section 5 enforcement authority to prosecute companies that employ 
“unfair or deceptive” data-collection practices.317  Many proponents of the 
FTC approach, however, recognize that, due to the impact the IoT will have, 
the FTC must adjust its current approach in order to become more 
effective.318  Some of these scholars have argued for a more robust notice-
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and-choice regime,319 while other scholars have highlighted the need for 
greater guidance from the FTC for best practices.320 
The FTC model is attractive in that it provides a middle ground.  It does 
not overburden IoT companies with regulations and ensures some form of 
protection for consumers.  Further, the proposals to improve the current FTC 
would certainly make the model more effective in the era of the IoT.  
However, even with the implementation of these proposals, the FTC’s section 
5 authority is ultimately limited.321  Thus, without supporting federal privacy 
legislation, using the FTC to enforce against unfair or deceptive practices by 
smart-device manufacturers will ultimately be insufficient.322 
Proponents of the third approach, the activist approach, argue that the 
government should actively regulate the IoT by mandating specific data-
collection practices for smart devices.323  This approach is most beneficial 
because it would proactively ensure that consumers are aware of how their 
data is being used.  As stated above, critics of this approach have argued that 
enacting legislation in the early stages of the IoT could have a harmful effect 
on innovation.324  Critics also argue that limiting data-collection practices 
through IoT regulation could hurt consumers because data collection can be 
a useful tool for understanding and addressing consumer needs.325  
Regardless of the strengths and weaknesses of the activist approach, 
Congress has declined to regulate privacy for years, and it is unlikely that it 
will do so in the era of the IoT.326 
B.  Addressing Data-Privacy Concerns at the State Level 
Due to the problems with the self-regulatory model of notice and choice,327 
the FTC’s limited enforcement authority under section 5,328 and Congress’s 
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stagnation in legislating privacy, this Note argues that state governments are 
in the best position to regulate the IoT.329  This Part discusses why states are 
in a strong position to regulate the IoT and acknowledges the novel problems 
posed by the IoT.  It goes on to recognize the current problems with the 
notice-and-choice model and to propose specific state-level requirements to 
effectively regulate IoT companies. 
1.  Benefits of Regulating the IoT at the State Level 
Both the novelty and complexity of the IoT make it difficult to regulate.  
Accordingly, experimentation is necessary to expediently find the most 
effective method for protecting the private data of consumers.  Justice Louis 
Brandeis highlighted the unique role state governments may play in this 
regard:  “It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single 
courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try 
novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the 
country.”330  In this spirit, this Note recommends that individual state 
governments take the lead in formulating IoT regulations to experiment with 
and ultimately arrive at the most effective policy. 
State governments are uniquely positioned to address issues of consumer 
privacy because they can serve as laboratories without having a negative 
impact on the rest of the country.  In fact, state attorneys general have been 
addressing issues of privacy for years.331  Furthermore, while the FTC was 
promulgating the self-regulatory model, state attorneys general recognized 
the need for consumer protection and applied UDAP laws for privacy-related 
enforcement activity.332  State attorneys general are well positioned to 
address privacy-related harms because they are closer to the problems, 
accountable to their voters, and face fewer bureaucratic requirements, which 
enables them to advance proposals with speed and efficiency.333 
Critics of state privacy enforcement argue that promoting this model will 
lead to overenforcement, with fifty states pursuing the same company for a 
single data-privacy or security violation.334  However, in reality, states have 
limited legal resources and, as a result, want to share the burden of pursuing 
litigation against companies.335  Furthermore, IoT regulation is unlikely to 
be implemented in every state.  Another criticism of state privacy 
enforcement is that federal law could preempt state privacy and security laws 
in favor of a uniform standard.336  Federal preemption would be beneficial if 
it would increase efficiency.337  However, due to the novelty of the IoT, it is 
 
 329. See infra Part III.B.1. 
 330. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 331. See Citron, supra note 247, at 749 (expressing that state attorneys general have been 
on the “front lines” of privacy enforcement even before federal agencies). 
 332. See id. at 749–50. 
 333. See id. at 750, 786. 
 334. See id. at 796–97. 
 335. See id. 
 336. See id. at 801–02. 
 337. See id. at 801. 
2548 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86 
unlikely that a federal law would maximize efficiency at this time because 
there has been little experimentation with how to regulate the IoT.  Quickly 
implemented, universal, and untested regulation is likely to result in 
bureaucratic excess and inefficacy.  Further, the possibility of Congress 
enacting privacy legislation remains unlikely.338 
Finally, critics also point out the dormant Commerce Clause339 as a 
restraint on state privacy laws.340  However, “no court has struck down a state 
data breach notification law on the basis of the dormant Commerce Clause” 
to date, and there is no reason to believe that courts will strike down similar 
state IoT regulations on that basis in the future.341  In short, the criticisms of 
state privacy regulation are unlikely to have any impact on the proposed 
model for state IoT regulation. 
2.  Suggestions for State Laws to Address IoT Legal Concerns 
Recognizing the benefits of implementing regulations for smart-device 
companies at the state level and the need to experiment with different 
regulations to establish what will work best, this Part sets forth proposed rules 
for the states to consider.  This Note proposes that an exemplar state should 
experiment with IoT regulation by mandating specific requirements for 
smart-device companies to ensure that consumers are adequately informed of 
devices’ data-collection practices.  The proposals for the specific notice 
requirements were determined based on the analysis of problems with smart-
device privacy policies.342  In addition, using basic contract principles, this 
Note suggests that the exemplar state should require smart-device companies 
to obtain an active manifestation of assent by users before enabling the 
device.343 
a.  Notice Proposal 
This Note has highlighted specific privacy and security harms that may 
befall a consumer from the collection of personal data via smart devices.344  
Due to the nature of these harms, consumers must be fully aware of the risks 
associated with their devices.  Because most smart-device privacy policies 
fail to adequately inform users of these risks,345 this Note proposes five rules 
for the exemplar state to implement that require smart-device companies to 
provide adequate notice, which will ultimately enable users to make informed 
choices about whether to use smart devices. 
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First, because smart-device privacy policies are often difficult to find, 
consumers lack awareness that a policy exists at all.346  Thus, consumers who 
purchase a smart device should be made immediately aware of the existence 
of a policy either on delivery or upon setting up the device.  This could be 
achieved by including the privacy policy in the box or by having the policy 
appear for the user upon setting up the device through an application. 
Second, the language used in privacy policies is often unclear or vague.347  
There are a number of different rules that could be implemented to make 
privacy-policy language clearer.  For instance, the exemplar state could 
mandate that privacy policies provide consumers with concrete descriptions 
of their data-collection practices.348  Under this model, instead of stating that 
the device collects “personal information,” the policy would list the specific 
types and amounts of data it collects.349  In addition, the exemplar state could 
require policies to use definitive rather than permissive language.350  For 
example, policies could be required to state when exactly user data will be 
shared, instead of saying “we may share your data.”351  Notice rules could 
also mandate that privacy policies be presented in the active, rather than 
passive, voice in order to increase clarity.352 
Third, it is extremely time consuming to read smart-device privacy 
policies.353  To address this issue, the exemplar state could implement length 
restrictions on privacy policies.  Some scholars have suggested a policy 
resembling that of nutrition labels, which would require companies to 
summarize succinctly the key points from the policy.354  The “nutrition label” 
approach would significantly limit the time required to understand the policy 
and potentially increase the likelihood of consumers reading it.355 
Fourth, smart-device privacy policies often omit important information.356  
The exemplar state should identify information that it believes is critical for 
consumers to be aware of regarding a smart device’s data-collection practices 
and mandate that this information be included in the privacy policy.  Privacy 
policies could be required to include information, such as what data is 
considered personally identifiable, whether the data the device collects is 
personally identifiable, how the device collects data, how long the data is 
retained, who owns the data, and when and with whom the data is shared. 
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Finally, smart-device users are particularly susceptible to security-related 
harms.357  While the majority of states already have data-breach notification 
laws,358 it is also critical that smart-device users are put on notice of the 
security risks associated with their devices.  Therefore, the exemplar state 
should also mandate requirements for smart-device companies to inform 
users of how they are protecting user data and the potential security risks 
associated with collection of that data. 
b.  “Manifestation of Assent” Proposal 
Contract law requires the manifestation of mutual assent between 
parties.359  Privacy policies have consistently failed to be given contractually 
binding weight, and one reason for this may be that their browsewrap form 
makes it impossible to establish clear manifestation of assent.360  Thus, this 
Note argues that, similar to legally binding contracts, it is imperative that 
consumers of smart devices manifest their express assent to the practices laid 
out in the privacy policy.  Currently, privacy policies do not require active 
manifestation of assent, and as a result consumers do not read them.361  
Requiring consumers to be active in the agreement is likely to make them 
more willing to read what is being presented before blindly agreeing to it.  
Furthermore, if the nutrition label recommendation was implemented,362 
consumers could go through the agreement process relatively quickly.  By 
requiring an active manifestation of assent, the exemplar state would be 
implementing another policy aimed at protecting consumers to make them 
aware of what they are agreeing to. 
This manifestation of assent could be obtained through a format similar to 
a clickwrap agreement.363  When setting up the device, users would be 
required to affirmatively click “I Agree” to show that they consent to the 
data-collection practice.  For devices that do not require an application or a 
screen for set up, consumers could manifest assent by using products so long 
as a notice was visibly posted that informed users that their use would 
constitute assent.  Ultimately, requiring the manifestation of assent to the 
explicit terms laid out in the privacy policy will serve as another protection 
for consumers using smart devices. 
CONCLUSION 
As the IoT expands, the amount of data collected from smart devices will 
grow and create extensive data profiles on consumers.  While the IoT 
promises to make life easier and more efficient, the mass quantities of data 
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that are being collected, stored, and shared open consumers up to security 
and privacy risks. 
Under the current model of self-regulation in the United States, however, 
consumers are unaware of these risks and are left legally empty-handed when 
they suffer a harm.  Thus, this Note argues that the pervasive nature of smart 
devices calls for greater privacy regulation.  This Note recognizes that the 
novelty of the IoT will require experimentation and calls on an exemplar state 
to implement laws to regulate the IoT and ensure that consumers are aware 
of its risks. 
 
